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ABSTRACT: Modern Greece has held a marginal existence in the
study of nationalism, and yet there is a wealth of information that it
provides which can broaden our understanding of nationalism and
state-building, especially in the Balkans. The purpose of this article
is to examine the various facets of Greek identity during the
outbreak of the independence movement, and how that identity
shaped and affected the movement itself. This article argues that
socioeconomics paired with Greek regional identities hindered the
creation of a strongly defined national identity. Furthermore, this
lack of national identity led to several years of civil war during the
independence movement and to the political strife that
characterised the newly formed state. This article examines the
complexities of the Greek War of Independence and the weak
sense of Greek national identity through a distinctive examination
of socioeconomic identity within the Greek-speaking lands.
In the winter of 1832, nearly twelve years after fighting
began, the members of the independent Greek state welcomed their
new ruler. As the Bavarian-born King Otto arrived in the Bay of
Nafplion, many Greeks “in their varied and picturesque dresses,
hailed the young monarch as the deliverer from a state of society as
intolerable as Turkish tyranny...The uniforms of many armies and
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navies, and the sound of many languages, testified that most
civilised nations had sent deputies to inaugurate the festival of the
regeneration of Greece.”1 Otto had inherited a new state that, after
several years of discord, was established by the Great Powers
without any input from a Greek delegation. It was a state where a
host of separatist identities gave birth to a hotbed of factionalism
and disunity, which were further magnified during the Greek
movement for independence.
The Greek aspiration for independence was part and parcel
of European ideas of freedom associated with the establishment of
sovereign nation-states during the Age of Revolution. During this
time, Enlightenment ideologies that pushed for more liberal
societies led to the formation of new states throughout Europe, and
this revolutionary fervor touched the people of the Greek world as
they developed a strong desire for revolution and independence
from Ottoman rule.2 In the spring of 1821, a revolt broke out in the
Peloponnesus, marking the start of the Greek War of
Independence. The war against the Ottoman Empire, which would
last for nearly a decade, was characterized on the Greek side by illpreparedness, heavy fragmentation, civil war, and geopolitical
maneuverings. It did ultimately result in the establishment of the
Greek state, but this state was one established by the Great Powers,
void of Greek representation, and with boundaries far smaller than
had been hoped for by the Greek people.
In the study of the Greek independence movement, it is
important to remember that although Greece has had a place in
written history for over two millennia, its formal identity as a
nation is less than two centuries old. Greece has always been at the
“crossroads” of cultural exchange and this in turn has created a
large mosaic of identity, interlocking various groups into a

1
George Finlay, History of The Greek Revolution, vol. 2 (London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 291.
2
John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, introduction to Nationalism,
eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), 7; Anthony Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press,
1991), 35.

Madison Historical Review

53

culturally Greek realm.3 Dating from the establishment and
expansion of the Byzantine Empire, the Orthodox Church and the
Greek language functioned as the two primary factors that bound
south-eastern Europe together, creating an “expansive multi-ethnic,
religious, and linguistic domain,” which in turn led to a loosely
defined Greek identity.4 This Greek identity was allowed to
continue under Ottoman rule due to Istanbul’s millet system, which
was a policy that allowed religious and cultural freedom at the
price of a heavy tax burden. However, it is because of this
elasticity in Greek identity—many Greek speakers identified more
closely with their regions and specific locales—as well as the
socioeconomic conditions under the Ottoman Empire that we see
such regional diversity in the Greek world emerge during the 400
year period of Ottoman influence (a period also known as the
Tourkokratia).
The scholarly literature on nations and nationalism is vast.
However, in the discussion of Greek identity and the formation of
the state, vital questions can be posed through the seminal work of
Benedict Anderson and his idea of the nation as an “imagined
community.” Anderson analyzes the nation not only as an
“imagined political community,” but also one that is
simultaneously “limited and sovereign.”As he explains, the nation
is imagined “because most of the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them,
or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their community.”5 Typically members of these communities, with
the help of print capitalism to disseminate ideas, come together
under the basis of several factors: language, religion, culture,
history, and political ideologies. Nationalism, as posited by Ernest
Gellner, is the process that “invents” nations through narrating
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B. Dobratz and Y. Kourvetaris, A Profile of Modern Greece in Search
on Identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 1.
4
Robert S. Peckham, Natural Histories, Natural States: Nationalism
and the Politics of Place in Greece (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 2-3.
5
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1983), 6.
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national “histories” and “high culture.”6 This terminology as
defined by Anderson and Gellner leads to questions about the
Greek struggle for freedom from the Ottomans.
Given that the Greek independence movement was
spearheaded by an educated and wealthy diaspora, how would a
local population that is unlettered envision a Greek state that was
similar to the one imagined by the diaspora? In other words, whose
imagined community was it? Also, with an agrarian population
loyal to local notables and characterised by regional identities, how
would the new national Greek identity and boundaries of the state
be defined? Although many revolutions and independence
movements have corollaries of factionalism, as well as foreign
influence and involvement, what can be seen in the Greek struggle
for independence is a strong disconnect of unity amongst the Greek
people that plagued the movement from its conception and became
magnified throughout the war itself. It is through a thorough
examination of the independence movement that the lack of a prior
strong national identity can be observed.
Outside of Greece, the topic of Greek nationalism has held
a marginal existence in the collective study of nationalism;
however, it is precisely through understanding how nationalism
played a role in nineteenth-century Balkan history that one can
better contextualise identity and state-building in the declining
Ottoman Empire. By closely examining the factionalism in the
Greek War of Independence, one can gain historical insight into
nationalist movements that emerge under empires, as well as parse
the crucial role of diversity in identity and how it can and did
affect them. It is also important to note when studying Greek
nationalism during the revolution that, although it has been called
the Greek Revolution or War of Independence in European
scholarship, it is referred to by Turkish historians as the Greek
Rebellion, which indicates that there are always multiple
perspectives in the study of nationalist movements. By stepping
away from the study of the Orthodox Church and geopolitics, both
6

Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfield and
Nicholson), 3.
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of which have dominated the scholarship on the topic, one can also
bring to light the aspect of social and regional identities during the
movement.
Anglophone scholarship about the Greek War of
Independence is minimal. The works produced on the topic over
the past few decades have nearly all addressed the conflict through
the paradigm of the so-called Eastern Question.7 More recent
works, such as Prousis’s Russian Society and the Greek Revolution
and Pizanias’s The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event,
continue the trend of examining the independence movement
through the lens of the European Powers.8 While these works do
contribute to our understanding of the Greek War of Independence,
they fail to investigate the war from a primarily Greek perspective
and attribute the war itself, and internal issues, to geopolitics or a
Greek desire to model itself after the Great Powers. Other works
have tended to romanticize the movement through the figure of
Lord Byron, creating an overwhelming British philhellenic
interpretation.9
Many Greek historians who have written about the Greek
War of Independence usually gloss over factionalism in order to
posit that the Greeks came together in unity to free themselves
from Ottoman oppression. These arguments are typically built
7

The Eastern Question was originally a nineteenth-century diplomatic
term that referred to the competition between major European powers, such as
Great Britain and Russia, to influence and control the perceived decline of the
Ottoman Empire. For a detailed study of this subject, please see: Lucien J. Fray
and Mara Kozelsky, eds., Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question
Reconsidered (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).
8
Prousis examines the Greek independence movement through the
response of the Russian Empire due to the need to protect others of the Orthodox
faith and against a regional enemy, the Ottoman Empire, in Theophilus C.
Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern
Illinois University Press, 1994); Pizanias examines the Greek Revolution as a
European event in which the Great Powers became involved in order to gain
influence in the Balkans, in Petros Pizanias, The Greek Revolution: A European
Event (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011).
9
For a recent interpretation of British Philhellenism, see: Roderick
Beaton, Byron’s War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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upon the work of the prominent Greek historian, Douglas Dankin,
who suggested that, although the independence movement had its
pockets of “lawlessness and factionalism,” the Greek people were
nonetheless brought together by a “sense of nationhood” in which
regional groups supported centralized government.10 However,
through the use of memoirs, travelogues, government documents,
and secondary literature, and by examining the various social
groups and regional identities within the Greek world, this article
suggests that rather than a “sense of nationhood,” it was the
common goal of freedom from the Ottoman yoke among the
peasants of mainland Greece that produced any sense of
unification that did emerge. Moreover, it was precisely because
various regional groups did not support centralized government,
but rather regional governments, that civil war erupted during the
independence movement. What becomes apparent is that even
though there was a sense of nationalism in the Greek struggle for
independence, the social and regional identities that were present
within the Greek world, and the educated diaspora’s particular
vision of a Greek state, deeply affected the movement. It was
because of the inability of the Greek people to create a cohesive
national identity that the Greek War of Independence assumed a
specific character of being dominated by factionalism and civil
war.
This article will begin by introducing the regions and main
socioeconomic groups within the Greek world prior to and during
the independence movement, as well as showing how each group
was viewed and characterized by others. After the introduction of
these main groups, this work will briefly assess the Greek War of
Independence, the formation of provisional governments, and the
civil wars that occurred during the movement to show how deeply
socioeconomic and regional groups clashed with one another,

Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-1833,” in
The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150 th Anniversary of
the Greek War of Independence, ed. Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut:
Archon Books, 1972), 159-177.
10
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creating disunity and hindering the formation of a national Greek
identity.
Regional and Social Identity
The Greek world, which was able to culturally survive
under Ottoman rule, was vast and encompassed most of southeastern Europe. In terms of Greek identity, the lines were blurred
due to the fact that Greek had remained the lingua franca of the
Balkans because of the Orthodox Church. However, when it came
to the actual Greek War of Independence, the revolutionary
fighting stayed within Greece proper. For purposes of
nomenclature, Greece proper refers roughly to the borders of the
modern-day country. It is divided into three regions: Morea
(modern-day Peloponnesus), Rumeli (present-day northern Greece
and into Macedonia and Bulgaria), and the Aegean islands.
Historically, Rumeli was further partitioned into east and west. In
the context of this essay, the term diaspora refers to any Greeks
living outside of Greece proper. Furthermore, the people of the
rural areas within these regions typically conceived of themselves
as provincial units in which the concept of a Patrida (fatherland)
and loyalty was confined to locales as they formed “a kind of
republic.”11 The existence of local “republics” also shows that the
concept of Greece and the definition of Greek identity were up for
grabs by various regional groups during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.
To understand how identity played a role in the movement,
it is crucial to examine the socioeconomic groups that developed
within the Greek sphere during the Tourkokratia. The three main
groups were the: Phanariots, merchants, and peasants. The
Phanariots were Greeks who were able to procure wealth by
obtaining local government positions from the central Ottoman
government, known as the “Porte,” in Istanbul. Given the semi11

Benjamin Brue, Journal de la campagne que la Grand vesir Ali
Pacha á faite en 1715 pour la Conquête de la Moreé (Paris: Ernest Thorin,
1870), 38.
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autonomous rule allowed throughout Greece and the Danubian
principalities, the Ottoman Empire relied on these Phanariots to
govern western regions and to collect heavy taxes, while the
Phanariots themselves enjoyed “special tax privileges.”12 As the
empire slowly declined, the Ottomans found it necessary to rely on
the Phanariots to enact governmental control in Eastern Europe
and in their dealings with the Christian West.13 The seats of power
obtained by Phanariots became synonymous with family and
corruption as the positions would pass from father to son, keeping
it within a patrilineal framework.
While the Phanariots came to enjoy their power and
influence within the empire, they slowly separated themselves
from the rest of the Greek people, exuding an almost Ottoman
identity. Unlike some of the other Greek social groups during this
time, which had gained wealth and affluence through commerce
and other means of their own production, the Phanariots used the
Turkish government to build pecuniary power and to bolster their
self-interests. Some of their contemporaries believed that
prominent Phanariots swindled the Ottoman government for
personal gain by syphoning off the taxes they collected and by
misadvising Turkish authorities in order to suit their own interests.
Further, these actions were continuously executed not with the
accession of other Greeks, but because they were a “body united in
their own interests.”14
The governmental authority and power bestowed upon the
Phanariots by the Ottomans created a group of Greeks who wished
to maintain and expand their power—in doing so, they often
embraced Ottoman customs and fashioned themselves after them.
During his travels through the Eastern Mediterranean, American
army officer William Eaton noted that “the most observable
12

Richard Clogg, introduction to The Struggle for Greek Independence:
Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, ed.
Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972), 2.
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Clogg,, introduction, 9-10.
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Photios Khrysanthopoulos and Satvros Andropoulos,
Apomnimonovemata peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos 1821-1828, vol. 1 (Athens:
Epikairoteta, 1899), 32-33.
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difference in the Grecian character is between those of
Constantinople and their countrymen of the islands…but there is a
race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise
those of the islands.” He continued by asserting that Phanariots
cared nothing more than to preserve the “opulence” that was
afforded to them as they fashioned themselves after the Ottomans
and maintained power over their fellow Greeks. They were also
“the only part of the nation [Greece] who have totally relinquished
the ancient Greek spirit; they seem not anxious as the islanders are
for liberty, but delight in false magnificence.”15 Various
Phanariots would play an integral role in the struggle for
independence by inciting revolution, through their involvement in
provisional government, and by heading factions of revolutionary
militia. However, it is easy to see with such disparities between
the wealthy Phanariots and their poor peasant brethren—who
would constitute most of the military forces—some of the fault
lines that became apparent during the fight for a Greek state. The
Phanriots’ desire to blend themselves within the Ottoman system
and their eagerness to maintain their power would only create
disdain among the people of Greece proper.
Like the Phanariots, Greek merchants slowly accumulated
wealth and produced powerful families, essentially creating a
Greek bourgeois class. However, merchant families amassed their
fortunes through their own endeavours, frequently by exploiting
the laxity in Ottoman trade laws.16 Many of these wealthy families
left Greece proper during the Tourkokratia and constituted the
Greek diaspora of Western Europe and the Russian Empire. As the
British physician and writer Henry Holland suggested: “The active
spirit of the Greeks, deprived in great measure of political or
national objectives, has taken a general direction towards
commerce.”17 The Ottoman leniency in regulating how these
15
William Eaton, A Survey of the Turkish Empire (London: T Caldwell
and W. Davies, 1809), 331. Emphasis added.
16
Clogg, introduction, 12.
17
Henry Holland, Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly,
Macedonia & c. during the years 1812 and 1813 (London: Longman, Hurst,
Rees, Orme and Brown, Paternoster-Row, 1819), 148.
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Greeks developed commercial strength within the empire allowed
them to expand their enterprise beyond their homes and into
neighbouring areas. Holland also noted how these families gained
power by emigrating into “adjacent countries,” and he gives an
example of the dispersal of four brothers from a single family:
“one was settled in Ioannina, another at Moscow, a third at
Constantinople, and the fourth in some part of Germany; all
connected together in their concerns.”18
It was outside of the Ottoman Empire that many of these
merchants set up Greek communities and began to build up their
wealth. Because of these communities throughout Russia and the
West, many families of the diaspora were able to hold on to their
Greek identity while adopting Western culture and attending the
universities of Europe. This in turn created a wealthy and educated
group far removed from Greece proper and the conditions within
the Ottoman Empire. While Phanariot families were almost
explicitly viewed with popular disdain, wealthy merchant families
were seen in a mixed light: they sometimes received praise but at
other times had their moral character called into question because
of the way they accumulated wealth.19 Just like the Phanariots, the
merchants became a distinct wealthy group within the Greek
world, but they were mainly outside of Greece proper and led lives
that were far different than those of their fellow Greeks in the
Peloponnesus where the revolution was centred. Just like the
ideologies they encountered through education, the merchants
desired a Greek nation with a liberal government modeled after the
emerging governments in the West. Much of this can be seen at the
beginning of the push for independence, as the primary visionaries
of the movement were from merchant families.
While some members of the diaspora were able to further
develop wealth and power outside of the Ottoman Empire, the
people of Greece proper were subjected to a power struggle
between the Venetians and Ottomans until the area finally came
18

Holland, Travels in the Ionian Isles, 149.
Samuel G. Howe, An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution (New
York: White, Gallaher & White, 1828), 18.
19
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under full Ottoman control in the late eighteenth century. The
population of Greece proper consisted mainly of peasants, who
were confined to subsistence farming and working the land of local
wealthy notables. The few Greeks who did own land during this
period used obligations of allegiance and force to make others cede
land ownership, as they would incorporate these new holdings into
their own domain and create substantial local power for
themselves.20
To understand the differences of social identity especially
that of the peasants, one needs to understand how Greek society
functioned. In a sociological study on modern Greek society,
Richard and Eva Blum used comparative analysis and concluded
that nineteenth-century, rural Greek society had remained, for the
most part, unchanged since the time of Homer; that is, society in
Greece proper had managed to remain agrarian, poorly educated,
and centered on loyalty to local leadership and towns.21 This
continuation in the function of peasant society was not the same
for wealthy merchants and the diaspora, who became educated
elites within a broader European society. Regardless of these
social differences within Greek society, one would suspect that a
common vision of a free Greek nation-state would emerge,
especially through the dissemination of liberal ideologies by the
diaspora; however, this was not the case. The peasants did not
“espouse” the same ideologies or vision of the diaspora.22 In fact,
the general consensus within the Greek world was that one of the
main groups that hindered Greek freedom was the merchants of the
diaspora, who were more concerned with life outside of Greece

20

Dionysios Zakythenos, The Making of Modern Greece: From
Byzantium to Independence, trans. K. Johnstone (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1976), 24.
21
Richard Blum and Eva Blum, Health and Healing in Rural Greece, a
Study of Three Communities (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1965).
22
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 29; Thomas Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the
Greeks, 1768-1913 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 74.
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proper than the realities faced by the peasants.23 With the peasants
abhorring their wealthy brethren, stark fissures became visible
within Greek society.
As the diaspora amassed wealth, the peasants within the
Greek world endured deplorable conditions. The disparities
between the peasants, regional notables, and the diaspora were
described by the French statesman Felix Beaujour when he noted:
“the peasants die of hunger while their landlords abound with
gold.”24 It was due to this exploitation and the constant threat from
Ottoman forces that many peasants fled into the hills and took up
brigandage. These bandits were known as klephts. They became a
thorn in the side of the Ottoman Empire, while they gained a Robin
Hood-like image with local peasants, which can be seen in folk
ballads such as “Christos Milionis” and “Olympos and
Kissabos.”25 Small bands of klephts would come down from the
hills and engage Ottoman troops in skirmishes, stealing and
pillaging in the process. As a countermeasure to the klephts, the
Ottomans created regional groups of armed forces to combat the
brigands; these hired bands of militia were called armatoloi. Many
men from both groups would often defect back and forth between
the two. One of the most famous generals of the war, Theodore
Kolokotronis, was once a klepht, then became an armatalos, and
then finally a klepht again. Howe wrote: “The klephts, or robbers,
were, as the Greeks styled them, wild armatoloi—that is, Greeks
who live by arms, but unlicensed by the Turks and in hostility to
them.” He also noted that military bands developed “under the
direction of different Greek chiefs.”26
The peasants generally lacked the education that would
have enabled them to envision a Greek nation governed by the
Anonymous, “Elliniki Nomarchia,” in The Movement for Greek
Independence, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1976), 106-117.
24
Felix Beaujour, A View of the Commerce of Greece: Formed after an
Average, from 1787 to 1797 (London: H.L. Calabin, 1800), 88.
25
John S. Blackie, Horae Hellenicae: Essays and Discussions on Some
Important Points of Greek Philology and Antiquity (London: Macmillan & Co.,
1874), 308.
26
Howe, An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, 21-22.
23
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people and founded upon specific Enlightenment principles.
However, they could not have failed to desire freedom from
economic exploitation and from the poor conditions that
accompanied their subjugation. Acknowledging these sentiments,
an American traveling through the Aegean wrote that the peasants
lived in “wretched Greek houses, in which there is neither chair,
table, nor bed, and where the miserable mothers often shut the door
in your face, looking at you as a new oppressor, come to plunder
them of their little substance.”27 The peasants, whose agrarian
lifestyle was essentially controlled by notables, became united
regional bodies under the influence of local powerful families.
Further, distinct characterizations were drawn amongst the various
people when it came to the regions in which they lived. In regards
to this regionalism, Thomas Gordon posited that: “Amongst
themselves certain shades of distinction are drawn; the Rumeliotes
being reckoned brave and hardy, the Moreotes timid and shy, and
the islanders of the Archipelago…acute and dexterous, but inclined
to indolence and frivolity.”28 It is the peasants who were the
bulkhead of the Greek forces during the revolution, fighting under
regional banners for freedom from the Ottoman Empire. The stark
differences in characterizations suggest more systematic lines of
difference, again suggesting how factionalism could become
commonplace, even from the conception of the independence
movement.
The Push for Independence
The two key pre-revolutionary figures, both of whom are
given credit as fathers of the revolution despite their different
visions of the movement, are Adamantios Koraïs and Rigas
Feraios. Both men were born into affluent families within the
Ottoman Empire but were educated in Western Europe, where they
27
Anonymous, “Visit to Joannina and Ali Pasha,” The North-American
Review and Miscellaneous Journal 10 (1820): 432.
28
Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, and the Wars and
Campaigns Arising from the Struggles of the Greek Patriots Emancipating Their
Country from the Turkish Yolk, vol. 1 (London: T. Cavall, 1844), lv.
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spent their adult lives creating revolutionary inspired works. By
secretly publishing works in Greek, the two men were able to reach
a broader audience and create revolutionary fervor within Greece
proper. By examining their pro-revolutionary ideologies, it
becomes apparent that both men were well aware of the conditions
within Greece, but had rather distinct approaches as to how a
revolution should be carried out.
Rigas Feraios was born into a wealthy family in Thessaly,
where he became well-educated before moving to Istanbul and
then later to Vienna. While in Vienna, Feraios was influenced by
contemporary events in revolutionary France, which inspired him
to envision a free Greece modeled after the new French Republic.
Feraios published a Greek-language newspaper from Vienna,
Ephemeris, in the hopes of reaching the broader Greek-speaking
population. The heavy influence of the French Revolution can be
seen in the pro-revolutionary works of Feraios such as his own
version of The Declaration of The Rights of Man and The New
Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the
Islands of the Aegean, and the principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia, published in 1797.29
Feraios called for an immediate revolt against the Ottoman
Empire and encouraged the unification of the Balkans to form a
Pan-Hellenic nation—in a sense a Byzantine revival uniting all
Greek-speaking peoples sharing a Greek culture within the region.
With no regard to possible “future ethnic divisions,” Feraios
believed that the Orthodox Church should play a minor role in the
new nation and the official language should be Greek.30 This
vision of a Pan-Hellenic nation was exemplified by his 1797 battle
cry, “Thourios,” in which Feraios called for all people of the
Balkans to rise up against the Ottoman Empire and free themselves
Rigas Feraios, “The Declaration of the Rights of Man,” (1797) in The
Movement for Greek Indpendence, ed. Richard Clogg, 150-157; Rigas Feraios,
“The New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the
Islands of the Aegean, and the Principalities of Moldovia and Wallachia” (1797)
in The Movement for Greek Independence, ed. Richard Clogg, 157-163.
30
Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short Story (New York: The Modern
Library, 2002), 72.
29
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from “slavery.”31 With the French Revolution transitioning into the
Reign of Terror, Austrian officials did not take kindly to such
revolutionary activity and Feraios was eventually captured,
murdered, and dumped into the Sava River in 1798. Reportedly
Feraios’ dying words were: “This is how brave men die. I have
sown; the time will soon come when my country will gather the
harvest.”32 For Feraios, the vision of a Greek nation was far
different from that of his contemporary, Koraïs.
Feraios’s interlocutor Adamantios Koraïs was born into a
prominent family in Smyrna. He had a passion for education and
made money by translating ancient Greek texts into modern
languages. Unlike Feraios, Koraïs did not have a desire to see a
unified Balkan Empire, but rather wanted freedom for the people
of Greece proper. In particular, he despised the Turks and the
thought of “living together with Turks” made him feel as though
he could fall “into genuine madness.”33 In 1788, Koraïs moved to
Paris where he was later heavily influenced by the French
Revolution. Koraïs recognized that the way to institute
Enlightenment ideologies was through education.
To Koraïs, the masses of Greece proper were ill-prepared
for a revolution, and he firmly believed that education and national
identity needed to be refined within the Greek world. Koraïs
posited that the “spread of education in the French nation gave
birth to the love of liberty,” and he believed it was the duty of the
wealthy Greeks to “educate our people.”34 In an attempt to begin
the process of education, Koraïs undertook the task of “purifying”
the Greek language. In his new Greek language, Katharevousa, he
sought to reform demotic Greek into a more pure language that
closely resembled ancient Greek. However, Katharevousa never
became widely used and was confined mainly to official
31

Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 29.
C. Perrevos, Sintomos Biographia tou Aїdimou Riga tou Thattalou
(Athens: John Agelopoulos, 1971), 328.
33
Adamantios Koraїs, “Autobiography of Koraїs,” in The Movement
for Greek Independence, ed. Richard Clogg, 126.
34
Koraїs, “Autobiography of Koraїs,” 127; Yiannis Notaras, O
Patriotikos Agonas tou Koraї (Thessaloniki: Macedonian Studies, 1976), 18.
32

66

Spring 2016

documents. Even when the revolution erupted in 1821, Koraïs
stood by his sentiments that the Greeks were still too
undereducated and unprepared to succeed. The Greeks “have not
yet enough learning to understand their true interest,” he noted,
stating that “the right time would have been 1850.”35 As shown by
these two pre-revolutionary figures, even before the birth of the
revolution there was already disagreement on how and when it
should begin, as well as problems defining a “motherland” and
what its boundaries should be. This problem of defining the Greek
sate would also be seen in the secret society founded to bring the
revolution into existence.
In 1814, three merchants founded the Philiki Etairia
(Society of Friends) in Odessa. The purpose of the society was to
build membership and procure the influence and money needed to
unite all Greeks to start a revolution to liberate the motherland.36
The society was slow to start but grew to a considerable size within
five years. The Philiki Etairia was comprised primarily of wealthy
merchants of the diaspora with little representation from Greece
proper other than a few regional notables from Rumeli, the islands,
and the Peloponnesus, where the revolution would take place.37 As
the society grew in size, its first task was to find a prominent
person to be a revolutionary figurehead, preferably one who could
garner support from a major European power. The first person who
was offered the position was the then-Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the Greek Ioannis Kapodistrias. He promptly declined and
warned the men that Greece was not yet ready for revolution, and
that Russia would play no part in backing it. “You must be out of
your senses, Sir, to dream of such a project,” Kapodistrias told the
Etairia member who approached him, “The only advice I can give
you is to tell nobody…they must abandon their revolutionary
course and live as before.”38 Kapodistrias’ rejection meant the
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society would have to find another influential individual who had
ties to a Great Power.
The next person the society approached was the young
Alexander Ypsilantis, who was from a prominent Phanariot family
and gained recognition through his service in the Russian military.
The eager Ypsilantis quickly accepted the position as leader with
the promise of Russian support, which caused money to flood into
the society. With a new prominent leader and its coffers full, the
Philiki Etairia soon began planning an outbreak of revolution.
There were initial plans to have dual points of outbreak, one in the
Danubian principalities (Romania) and one in the Peloponnesus.
However, only the Danubian Revolt came to fruition with
Ypsilantis leading a small army under the call to “fight for faith
and Motherland.”39
With no materialization of Russian support, which had
been promised by Ypsilantis, the Danubian Revolt quickly became
a disaster, ending with heavy losses and Ypsilantis’s imprisonment
in Austria. The Danubian Revolt suggests that the Greece that was
envisioned by the Philiki Etairia—composed mainly of the
diaspora—was one with considerably large borders and
reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire. One of the biggest problems
for the organization was creating a sense of motherland for an
agrarian society traditionally loyal to local notables and towns. As
suggested by Misha Glenny, the conspirators had a poor grasp of
the “idea of the geographical motherland, or who belonged in it.”40
The society’s revolutionary influence had been strong, but its
weaknesses in defining a motherland proved problematic.
Ultimately, the revolt that led to the Greek War of Independence
did begin within the Peloponnesus, but at the behest of its
inhabitants, not the Philiki Etairia.
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The Revolution and Civil War
In March 1821, the people of the Peloponnesus went into
open revolt against the Ottoman Empire, beginning the Greek War
of Independence within Greece proper. With the early success of
the revolt in the Peloponnesus, the people of the islands and
Rumeli took up arms as well, fighting effectively throughout
Greece proper and creating strongholds for revolutionary activity.
The people of the various regions within Greece were
simultaneously fighting for the control of numerous cities held by
the Ottoman military, which were spread far throughout the whole
of Greece proper. One of the first successes of the land war was
also one of the first instances in which regional identities became
apparent.
From the onset of the revolution, the variations in Greek
identity were visible. When forming an initial band of fighters and
throughout the war, the famous Peloponnesian General Theodore
Kolokotronis, repeatedly labelled his regular troops as “Maniotes,”
distinguishing them from other Greeks by indicating they were
from the Mani region, and attesting to their fearlessness and fierce
fighting abilities.41 This tendency to label other Greeks shows how
Greeks characterized and identified one another by their specific
region. At the outbreak of the revolution, a band of Peloponnesian
troops blockaded the island citadel of Monemvasia. The Greek
forces cut off supply lines to the Ottoman troops in the citadel,
starting a siege that would last several months. When the Ottomans
were ready to discuss terms of surrender, they refused to speak
with the besiegers; instead, they held negotiations with a diaspora
representative, Dimitirios Ypsilantis—the brother of the
imprisoned Alexander. When they learned of the negotiations,
those who were responsible for the siege were angered and said
41
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that they, “the Peloponnesians…had used their resources and spilt
their blood,” therefore, “the surrender should be to the Greek
people, to Ellinikon ethnos.”42 From the response of the
Peloponnesians, it is apparent that there was a sense of disconnect
between the people of Greece proper and the diaspora. The term
Ellinikon ethnos (Greek people) suggests that the Peloponnesians
saw themselves as the true representatives of a Greek state, not the
member of the diaspora, or any Greeks outside of the
Peloponnesus for that matter.
In July 1821, as the Greek advances became more
numerous, Dimitrios Ypsilantis arrived in Greece proper to assert
leadership over ground forces and give the diaspora representative
leadership. His arrival immediately caused a schism within the
movement and this division continued to grow as the war raged on.
When Ypsilantis entered Greece proper, he had support from
powerful members of the diaspora. However, the military leaders
put all their support behind the Peloponnesian General
Kolokotronis, and a third faction emerged that supported other
Peloponnesian notables. When Ypsilantis suggested that a
government be established with him as leader, regional notables
objected and discord soon ensued, with troops plotting the demise
of various notables. Worried that word of the rising internal
tensions would reach the European powers from whom the Greeks
hoped to gain support, Kolokotronis stated: “If we kill our own
primates, what will the kings say?”43 With his influence,
Kolokotronis was able to temporarily quell the agitated troops, but
the factions grew further apart when the Greeks began the task of
forming a new government.
Six months after the revolution began, regional Greek
representatives began to form their own various governments. In
the Peloponnesus, primates came together to form a senate, which
produced a political entity that sought to continue the war as its
42
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members saw fit.44 North of the Peloponnesus, two other regional
governments emerged. In eastern Rumeli a government was
formed with a prominent Phanariot, Alexander Mavrokordatos, as
its leader, whereas in western Rumeli, a separate government was
formed under the Phanariot Theodore Negris. The development of
these government bodies led to further factionalism, and to make
matter worse, the regional groups viewed each other with
particular disdain. As historian John Petropoulos has suggested, the
Rumeliots thought the Peloponnesians were “untrustworthy and
effete,” while the Peloponnesians saw the Rumeliots as “backward
and boorish,” while the people of the islands “displayed an insular
contempt for all mainlanders.”45 The Greeks realized that to
continue with the revolution, a single government needed to be
formed, but with discord being brought to the surface by regional
tensions, factionalism was about to boil over.
A year into the war, regional representatives met in the
Peloponnesian town of Epidaurus to draft a provisional
constitution and form a centralized, representative government.
The drafting council was heavily influenced by Negris and
Mavrokordatos. This constitution was based on an American
model, which called for three branches of government to form a
system of checks and balances, and was meant to last only for a
year until a new constitution was written.46 When it came time to
decide the leadership of the branches, the influence of the
Phanariots was apparent as Mavrokordatos became the head of the
executive branch, and Negris and Kolettis (Negris a Phanariot and
Kolettis a wealthy merchant from Epirus) filled the other two seats.
Although the goal of the assembly was to create unity, the result
was arguably the opposite; there was no dissolution of the regional
governments, and no representation for the prominent military
44
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leaders who had been so influential in the movement.47 In essence,
the convention at Epidaurus failed to achieve its main goal, the
formation of a strong centralized government.
Immediately after the council, Mavrokordatos returned to
his stronghold in Rumeli, where he planned to execute his new
presidential powers. With Mavrokordatos away from the
Peloponnesus, General Kolokotronis gained increased support and
popularity through various military successes. This is turn led
many to question if the leadership of the new government had been
chosen incorrectly. What resulted from the growing dissatisfaction
was essentially two government entities: one based in the
Peloponnesus under the influence of Kolokotronis, and another in
Rumeli still under the leadership of Mavrokordatos.48 As tensions
widened the rupture in Greek politics, another council was called
in April 1823 to draft a new constitution—albeit a year later than
what was originally proposed at the first council.
The representatives present were double that of the
original, with more than half coming from the Peloponnesus. At
the second council the atmosphere was frantic, and as Trikoupis
described it, “disorderly and alarming.”49 The main goal of the
second assembly was to write a constitution that strengthened
central authority and to prove to Europe that Greece was capable
of being a modern European nation.50 However, tension at the
47
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council was such that two rival factions, along with their armed
militias, ended up staying in different towns. One faction
supported Mavrokordatos, while the other supported Kolokotronis.
When General Kolokotronis threatened to end the council and take
complete control of the military, the executive position was offered
to him as a way to ease tension and garner popular support.51
Kolokotronis accepted the offer, but factionalism remained strong
and led to a power struggle between the former executive and nowhead of the senate, Mavrokordatos, and his successor
Kolokotronis.
Civil war soon ensued between two regional government
bodies, one backed by the Peloponnesus and the other by Rumeli
and the islands. For the next two years of the revolution,
consecutive civil wars engulfed Greece, pitting the regions of
Greece proper against one another.52 While a power struggle
definitely played a part in the factionalism that developed within
the movement, it is also important to understand how regional
identity acted as a driving force behind the conflicts. As infighting
plagued Greece proper, the leader of the Rumelian government,
Mavrokordatos, stayed at his stronghold in Messolonghi. In a letter
to Mavrokordatos, the statesman Spyridon Trikoupis suggested
that the leader not join efforts to militarily supress Peloponnesian
power, but rather stay in Messolonghi and “attend to the interests
of his own region.”53
What can be inferred from this correspondence is that, not
only did Trikoupis acknowledge that power interests ran along
regional lines rather than solely within small factions, but he also
suggested that the civil war was characterised by regionalism.
Additionally, the Peloponnesian leader Andreas Zaimis wrote to
his regional counterpart, Andreas Londos, that the inhabitants of
the islands (who were allied with Rumeli) sought “the elimination
51
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of any Peloponnesians with substantial power and influence,”
further suggesting regionalism as the basis for the ongoing power
struggle. 54
Another way in which we can understand how many
Greeks saw themselves within the Greek world, is to look to the
memoirs of the Rumelian commander, Yannis Makriyannis. Upon
examination of Makriyannis’ writings it is apparent that, although
all those involved considered themselves Greek, they specifically
saw themselves as regional Greeks; that is, a Rumelian Greek, or a
Morean Greek, etc. It was commonplace for Greek people to
preface their Greek identity with regional or city monikers. This
regional identification during the civil wars, as well as the power
struggle between regional notables is apparent when Makriyannis
wrote: “other Rumeliots and the Peloponnesians as well wish to
keep you slaves and advance their own interests…and stir up one
civil war after another.” Furthermore, Makriyannis referred to the
members of the diaspora involved in the war as simply “those who
come from over the border.”55 This rhetoric gives insight into how
the Greeks of Greece proper viewed the diaspora. It is this
adherence to regionalism that proved to be a hindering factor in
creating a strong national Greek identity during the war of
independence. These regional identities and the civil wars during
the independence movement are also reminiscent of the polis
system of classical Greece and the Peloponnesian War; regional
identities and alliances fuelled a power struggle between all
Greeks.
While the Greeks were occupied by three years of
infighting, Egyptian forces entered the war to aid the Ottomans. In
1825, the Egyptians began taking back many of the Ottoman losses
in the Peloponnesus and stripped the Greeks of their most
important strongholds. With heavy losses and the massacre of
Greeks in numerous Peloponnesian villages, Greek aspirations for
54
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freedom began to look ominous to those fighting against the
Ottomans. Amidst these new developments, the Greeks
temporarily put their differences aside and united once again. With
the promise of foreign intervention, Greek forces began to push
back the Ottoman advances. In 1827, after numerous appeals from
the Greeks, Britain, France, and Russia finally intervened and the
Greek War of Independence was won at the Battle of Navarino. It
was at the Battle of Navarino that the famous British admiral
Edward Codrington nearly lost a leg and was so badly injured that
the Duke of Wellington relieved him of his duties, although the
official reason given was Codrington’s failure to adhere to
orders.56
Because of the intervention of the Great Powers at
Navarino, historians have debated whether or not foreign
intervention came due to the emergence of notions of
Philhellenism, or because of the desire of the European nations to
curb Ottoman dominance in the region. What is less debated is
whether or not the Greeks would have gained independence
without the involvement of the Great Powers; scholars insist they
most certainly would not have.57 After the defeat of the Ottomans,
the people of Greece experienced a period of interim government
before finally achieving statehood in 1830. Ironically, the person
who filled the position of interim president was none other than the
former Russian Foreign Minister and the man who declined the
Philiki Etairia, Kapodistrias.
Kapodistrias made it his task to unify the regional groups
still present within Greece, but factionalism between these camps
remained high and he was ultimately unsuccessful.58 In 1831,
members of the Mavromichalis family—notables from the
Peloponnesus—assassinated Kapodistrias, which prompted the
Great Powers to hold the London Conference and establish the
Greek state as a constitutional monarchy. It was during this
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conference that the national borders and the new monarch were
decided, but the conference was lacking Greek representation and
the decisions were made without any Greek consultation.59 After
the Treaty of Constantinople was signed and enacted in July 1832,
the Greeks solidified their independence and an autonomous Greek
nation was officially recognised by Europe. Greece was now a
monarchical state under King Otto, a Bavarian prince, and the
country’s borders consisted of the most southern portion of
Rumeli, the Peloponnesus, and a handful of Aegean islands. The
establishment of the new government by the Great Powers created
even more factionalism amongst the Greeks as a royalist versus
non-royalist divide emerged, and the development of political
parties influenced by the British, French, and Russians added even
more aspects to identity and nationhood.
Conclusion
The Greek War of Independence was successful in that the
Greek people were able to gain independence from the Ottoman
Empire, but it is less clear to what extent it succeeded in creating a
unified Greek state and national identity. As many historians have
agreed, the Greeks would have never succeeded with their
revolution had the European powers not intervened. It is through
this intervention that the Greek state was established in 1832,
although the nation born was a very “truncated” version of what
was hoped for at the onset of revolution.60 From the outbreak of
the revolution, the Greek struggle was heavily marked by internal
struggle that continually manifested itself in infighting and
political tumult. Greece itself, though imagined as a cultural and
political entity in the minds of people for over two thousand years,
had never been a tangible nation-state. Even before the Age of
Pericles and the Hellenistic era ushered in by the achievements of
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Alexander the Great, the Greek realm and its influence had
expanded and contracted over the centuries.
Variation in identity and internal warfare can be traced
back to ancient times and be seen in examples such as the IonianDorian divide and the Peloponnesian War. Once the people of the
Byzantine Empire had fallen under Ottoman control, the semiautonomous governments that the Greeks were afforded during the
Tourkokratia only helped to strengthen regional identities and
develop stark differences in the socioeconomic groups of the
Greek world. Although some historians may question the term
regionalism, it is appropriate in the case of the Greek War of
Independence. Even though it can be argued that regionalism
would suggest that a Peloponnesian or Rumelian state would have
been established, it is hard to say without asserting inevitability
what the independence movement’s eventual outcome would have
been without the aid of the Great Powers. However, given the
pockets of regional governments and the lack of centralized
authority, more than likely the various regions would have become
their own governing entities.
Although some Greeks were afforded wealth and power
under Ottoman rule, specifically the Phanariots, there was a
growing trend towards freedom amongst the Greeks as a whole. At
the same time that Greek nationalism was on the rise, so too were
the differences in Greek society. The formation of the Philiki
Etairia and its subsequent undertakings can almost certainly be
credited for the start of the Greek War of Independence, but the
organization itself was founded by men who had built their wealth
and had been educated outside of the Greek peninsula, living in
situations much different than those found in Greece proper.
Moreover, although the onset of revolution can be attributed to the
Philiki Etairia, it produced vague goals, and was unable to
properly define what constituted the motherland or help create
cohesion in identity.61 It is because of this reason that after the
failed Danubian Revolt and the Peloponnesians’ successful
uprising without the diaspora, that the Philiki Etairia had little
61
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representation once the war began. As suggested by Richard
Clogg, the national ardor created by the Greek diaspora was not
necessarily shared by the “unlettered” people of Greece proper,
and this led to problems for the Greeks when it came to imagining
what an autonomous Greek state would look like.62
When the independence movement finally became a reality,
the various wants and goals of the different Greek social groups
were too divergent to create a symbiotic relationship amongst
them. After the war against the Ottoman Empire began, the
dissimilarities and the subsidiary aims of the different groups came
to the forefront. The Greek elites wanted to maintain political
power bereft of the Ottomans, the military leaders wanted to create
their own centers of power, and the peasants wanted a chance at
owning land and improving their living situations.63 Nowhere were
these differences echoed more loudly than in Greece proper, due
the fact that it was in a semi-autonomous state under Ottoman rule.
This lack of an Ottoman presence allowed for the creation of
regional identities and power vacuums under wealthy landowners
that only turned into pronounced factionalism once the revolution
started.64
The factor of regional identity can be seen in the memoirs
of the famous general Makriyannis, who acknowledged that the
diaspora were different than other Greeks, repeatedly referred to
himself as Rumelian, described others by their region—such as
Peloponnesian—and only sporadically used the term Greek as a
collective identifier.65 It was conventional for one to have
allegiance to their specific locale and distinguish themselves as
from that region or town before recognizing themselves as Greek.
When it comes to identity, Greek historian Theodore Zervas has
recently posited that the modern Greek national identity did not
emerge until after the establishment of the state, and that it was
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through language and education reforms that it was ultimately
developed.66
Although there was the main goal and unifying factor of
freedom from Ottoman rule, it was the obvious diversity in Greek
identity that made the War of Independence and creation of the
state a very disruptive and tumultuous period, characterized by
spurts of “anarchy” and “fratricidal conflicts.”67 Even
retrospectively, many Greeks found the regional variations of
identity and language too overwhelming to create true national
cohesion, and some also found ways to poke fun at this aspect of
the Greek world. Less than a decade after the end of the revolution,
Dimitrios Vyzantios satirized the extreme diversity of the Greeks
in his comedy Babel. In this comedy, which was set in the time
frame immediately after the Battle of Navarino, Vyzantios
described different scenarios of near chaos caused by the meeting
of all these different Greeks, and likened it to the biblical story of
Babel.68 Ever since the formation of the state, Greece’s legacy has
been tarnished by political strife, upheaval, and constant
reorganization. While historians on the topic readily acknowledge
the turmoil that plagued the revolution, they have traditionally
attributed this post-revolutionary factionalism to foreign
involvement. Although this outside involvement did antagonize the
factions within Greece, it merely helped to magnify an already
existing problem.
During the Tourkokratia, Greek populations were spread
throughout the expansive Ottoman Empire, creating different
Greek socioeconomic groups and strengthening the differences in
regional identities. Greek regional commitments played a strong
role in obstructing a national identity, and it was the regionalism
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present within the Greek world, coupled with the competing goals
of the groups involved, which hindered the success of the Greek
Revolution. Yes, the Greeks were successful in gaining their
independence from Ottoman rule, but they were unable to establish
a cohesive Greek national identity that was needed to foster
unification under a centralized government, and a create state that
was not characterized and plagued by internal discord. The defeat
of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Greek state were
ultimately executed by the Great Powers, but this was not the
definitive reason for the subsequent political turmoil; it only acted
to compound the factors of disunity that were already present.

